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Income  tax  progressivity  is  studied using Generalized  Entropy measures  of 
inequality.  Luxembourg Income Study data sets for ten countries are used for 
international comparative purposes and analysis.  Progressivity indices are 
generated using the Generalized Entropy family as well as Atkinson measures. 
This is to test the robustness  of our observation of tax progressivity in each 
country.  We  further our understanding by  looking at  pre-tax and  post-tax 
measures  of  inequality  based  on  gross  household  income  and  disposable 
household  income, respectively.  The decomposition property is shown  to be 
desirable in order to enhance our view of true inequality and the implication 
of taxes.  Thus decomposition  based on quintile, family sizes, and number of 
earners is conducted.  This has allowed an  interpretation of  results  that 
could be attributed to any of the above characteristics and components which 
are free of such group characteristics. I.  INTRODUCTION: 
One  of  the  basic  consequences of  income  taxation  is  to  modify  the 
distribution of income.  The relative economic standing  of households will be 
affected by  the  tax  unless  it  is  proportional.  However,  most  countries 
profess that their income taxes are progressive.  It is an accepted view that 
progressivity in taxation reduces overall income inequality  among households. 
However a reduction  in overall inequality  provides us a partial picture in the 
sense that inequality  between certain groups of households (the between-group 
component of inequality)  could be decreasing  while inequality  among households 
in the same group (the  within-group component of inequality)  is rising.' Thus, 
the decomposition  of the post-tax inequality  moves in a different direction to 
pre-tax decomposition.  Thus, when comparing the degree of tax progressivity 
of  two  or  more  nations,  it  is  desirable  to  look  at  decompositions  of 
inequality as well as overall inequality.  All single-number indices based on 
the  overall  measure  of  inequality  suppress  detailed  information  of  the 
underlying distribution.  Those distributions represented  by aggregated data 
rather than detailed  micro-data at the household or individual level suppress 
even more potentially  very relevant data. 
In what follows I will measure and compare income tax progressivity in 
ten countries by  looking at pre-tax and post-tax income inequality based on 
gross and net  incomes among households.  I employ Luxembourg Income Study 
household data sets for the United States, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the  United Kingdom, France, Canada, Switzerland,  and Australia.  There 
are a number of interesting  questions regarding the alternative tax systems. 
For  example: are  taxes more  redistributive in Western  Europe  than  in  the 
United States?; is there high correlation between tax progressivity and low 
inequality?; are the observed benefits due to tax splitting the same across 
countries?;  and etc. Several  inequality  indices  from  the  Generalized  Entropy  family  of 
measures  are  employed  and  the  robustness  of  the  results  is  observed. 
Decompositions  of the Generalized Entropy  measures are made to obtain further 
information about changes in the size distribution of  income resulting from 
income  taxes.  We  further  compare  our  approach  with  those  proposed  by 
Blackborby and Donaldson (1984) and Kiefer (1985) using the Atkinson indices 
of inequality. 
This  paper  outlines  the  methodology  for  inequality  measurement  and 
measurement of  tax  progressivity  in  section II.  Sections  III  through V 
discuss the results of  decompositions based  on  income  quintile, number  of 
earners, and family size respectively.  Section  VI discusses tax progressivity 
based  on  two  alternative measures  using  Atkinson  measures.  Section VII 
concludes. 
II.  THE FRAMEWORK 
To measure  tax progressivity with  insights regarding  the  treatment of 
particular sub-groups we  need an  index of relative inequality that for any 
population  and  its  partition,  overall  inequality  can  be  expressed  as  a 
weighted sum of  the  inequalities calculated-  for  each  sub-group and a  term 
summarizing between-group inequality.  Consequently our  choice of  index is 
restricted to the Generalized Entropy measures and they possess the desirable 
properties  of:  scale  independence, anonymity,  the  principle  of  transfer, 
smoothness, the principle of population, and decomposability see Cowell and 
Kuga (1981).  The inequality  measure I(Y; n) is a function of the population 
size n, i - 1 .  .  .  n, and  income sharesyEYn-  y-  (yl; .  .  . ;  y,)rO 
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This family includes Theil's (1967) information measures as IO and I-1. 
-y  is the degree of inequality  aversion.  For every -y  there exists a different 
index so by using a number of different 7  's we can test the sensitivity of 
measured inequality to the choice of index.  The differences in the nature of 
decomposability sets these measures apart from each other.  For example, I_1 
is different from IO in that it is weighted by population shares rather by 
income shares.  Thus,  1-1  might be better than  IO if the nature of analysis 
is such that population shares are preferred to income shares.  The latter is 
sensitive to  distributional changes.  This  family  also  includes monotonic 
transformations  of measures proposed  by Atkinson (1970): 
[ 
n 
(4)  IE(Y) - 1 -  l/n  z (nyi)  1-E l/(1+)  for E ) 0 
i-1  I 
It is evident that Iy (y) and IE(y) are ordinarily equivalent for values of E 
-  -y  >  0.  For the value 
Atkinson measures do not 
The  measurement of 
concentration index, or 
of 7 - 0 this equivalency  disappears.  Also for 7 > 0 
correspond to IT(y). 
tax progressivity can  be  approached  from  (a)  the 
(b) inequality index.  The  former approach  in  the 
measurement of progressivity  can be seen in: 
1)  Effective Progression [Musgrave  and Thin (1948)) 
2)  The Pechman-Okner  Index [Pechman  and Okner (1980)] 
4 3)  The Reynolds-Smolensky  Index [Reynolds  and Smolensky (1977)] 
4)  The Khetan Poddar Index [Khetan  and Poddar (1976)] 
5)  The Kakwani Index [Kakwani (1977)] 
6)  The Khetan-Poddar-Suits  Index [Khetan  and  Poddar  (1976)] 
The  above  progressivity  indexes  are  all  based  on  the  Gini  index  and 
concentration indexes.  Lambert (1989) provides a general discussion of each 
of the above. 
As we know the Gini index does not satisfy some desirable social welfare 
axioms [see  Atkinson (1970),  and Sen (1973)j.  The 
existence of a social welfare function, and uses 
distributed equivalent" introduced  in  Atkinson 
latter approach assumes the 
\ 
the concept of an  'Yequally 
(1970).  Using  Atkinson's 
family of measures the redistributive effect can be gauged by looking at the 
pre-tax and post-tax  income distribution.  Consider the progressivity index: 
(5)  PE  - IEW)  -  IE  WI) 
introduced by Kiefer  (1985), where  (GI) and  (DI) are  gross  and  disposable 
incomes respectively.  If PE > 0, the tax is progressive; if PE - 0, the tax 
is proportional;  and if PE < 0, the tax is regressive.  PE is an indicator of 
the  amount by  which  the  tax  system has  increased the  equally-distributed 
equivalent income,  given a social welfare function. 
An  alternative approach is  that introduced by  Blackorby and  Donaldson 
(1983)  and it is given as: 
(6)  pz  - IE(W  - I$GI) 
I 
This index is  normalized to zero and considers the percentage change.  Thus if 
Pz > 0, the tax is progressive; if Pz - 0, the tax is proportional; and if Pz 
5 < 0, the tax is regressive. 
In the spirit of Kiefer (1985), I will measure tax progressivity using 
the Generalized Entropy family  of measures.  Consider: 
(7)  1* * I.+GI) - I#DI) 
If I* > 0, the tax is progressive;  if I* - 0, the tax is proportional; and if 
1* < 0, the tax is regressive.  This type of measure does not account for 
reranking of households as taxes are imposed.  For example, given the pre-tax 
distribution as  [2,5], and the distribution of post-tax  income as ,[3,4] or 
(4,3] the overall index of tax progressivity does not account for the fact 
that in the latter case the individuals  have  traded places.  However, since 
Generalized Entropy  measures are decomposable,  I* can be shown as: 
(8)  1* - Ib* + Iw* 
where  Ib*  is  the  difference  of  the  pre-tax  and  post-tax  between-group 
component  of  income  inequality, while  Iw*  is  the  difference  of  average 
within-group inequality before and after taxes.  The proportion of change in 
I* due to Ib* is: 
(9)  Db  - IJDI) 
I 
while the proportion attributed  to the changes within-group is: 
(10)  D"  - 17(DI) 
I 
Thus, by definition D" + Db - 1.  Equations (8) provides valuable information 
6 which can enhance our understanding of the impact of taxes.  This information 
is disregarded if one does not perform the decompositions. 
For policy purposes it is very crucial to pay attention not only to the 
overall measures and  their decompositions, but  also  to  the  implication of 
taxation in each group.  The decomposition of the overall measure is a good 
guide as  to the importance of  the  "within-group" results.  If  the  average 
"within-group" component of the overall inequality constitutes a  substantial 
portion  of  the overall inequality it  is  important to  analyze  pre-tax  and 
post-tax inequality for each group as well.  Thus, for each characteristic 
type  (number of  earners and  family  size)  the  population  is  divided' into 
sub-groups.  Let  there be G groups, G - l,...,g.  For each group we measure 
tax progressivity  by: 
(11)  1* - 
g 
I; (GI) - I; (DI) 
where the first term in the right hand side is inequality in group g based on 
pre-tax income and the second term is inequality for the same group based on 
disposable income.  If  the value  of  1;  is shown  to move  in  the  opposite 
direction of I* one must pose a number of question regarding the efficiency of 
the tax system. 
III. INCOME SHARI3  AND TAX PROGRRSSIVITT 
In most countries income tax is the major source of government revenue. 
The effect of income tax is that it modifies the distribution  of income unless 
the tax is proportional.  Thus, the relative  purchasing  power of households is 
altered.  The rationale for subscribing to such a tax has been the subject of 
much  debate.  Since  governments must  raise  revenue  in  order  to  provide 
services, and household income provides an  elastic source  of  revenue when 
7 gross household income is growing, a progressive income tax is attractive. 
There are two equity principles which have helped justify progressive income 
taxation.  On one hand, "horizontal  equity" necessitates that income units in 
similar economic  standing be faced  with similar tax liabilities.  On the other 
hand, "vertical  equity" requires that the tax contribution of income  units be 
directly related to their ability to pay in order to equalize the sacrifice in 
terms of utility. 
Assuming the above principles are desirable from a welfare perspective, 
our objective is to investigate  whether or not they are in fact observed.  In 
doing so, we assume that household members pool their incomes and ‘either  at 
the individual  or household level they pay their income taxes.  Consequently, 
we  can  observe  the  household's  economic  standing  based  on  gross 
(pre-tax),  and disposable income (after-tax).  The difference between 
income distributions provides us  with  an  index of  progressivity. 
address horizontal  and vertical equity by way of our decompositions  as 
by looking at the changes in within-group inequality. 
Most  studies  analyze  income  tax  progressivity using  changes 
lorenze curve for a particular country based on pre-tax and post-tax 
income 
the two 
We  can 
well 8S 
in  the 
income. 
This  has been done with both aggregated data and,-  micro data.  Although this 
approach provides some  information,  it can mislead the analyst.  For example, 
if for a particular quintile the share of income  has changed after taxes, one 
is not certain  about the direction of change in inequality for that particular 
group.  Further analysis of the within-group inequality is needed. 
Table 1 provides pre-tax and post-tax income shares of households for ten 
countries based on  five quintiles.  Quintile 1 represents those with  least 
income while quintile 5 contains those with the highest  incomes.  There is 
clearly a transfer  from the top 20% (Quintile  5) to the lower quintiles in all 
ten  countries.  However  in  Canada, Germany, Israel,  the  Netherlands, the 
8 United Kingdom, and Australia, there is  transfer from  the  top 40%  to  the 
bottom 60% of the populations in each country.  Those quintiles  whose share of 
income has increased, post-tax, have a larger proportion of after-tax income 
than before-tax income allocated  to them.  However, 
treatment, within-group inequality could actually 
groups, even though overall inequality portrays a 
due to the differential in 
increase in some of  those 
declining pattern.  Thus, 
the income shares tell us something about the transfer that is taking place 
but  do  not  concern  themselves  with  its  distribution.  From  a  policy 
perspective, not only the reallocation  of income between groups but also the 
distribution of income within groups is of interest to insure the principles 
of horizontal and vertical equity. 
The starting point to analyze the impact of a tax is to choose a measure 
of inequality.  I have limited  my choice to the Generalized Entropy family due 
to its decomposability property.  I have four choices for 7: 2.0,  -  1.0,  - 
0.5, and 0.0.  Table  2 provides the measured inequality for ten countries 
based on gross income (GI) and disposable income (DI) of the households.  Our 
four choices for  y  cover a wide  range  and  allow  the analyst to  see how 





choice of 7. 
inequality is fairly sensitive to our choice of 7, and as 7 + 0, 
inequality generally is smaller.  Furthermore, the ranking of 
depends upon the choice of 7; at times quite dramatically.  For 
United States ranks anywhere from first to third depending on the 
France's ranking is anywhere from first to fifth depending on 
the choice of y.  However, for most countries the impact of our choice of 7 is 
small.  The  post-tax  positions of  countries also  depends on  y.  France, 
Australia,  Israel,  Canada  and  the  Netherlands  improve  their  ranking  or 
maintain their ranking for all choices of -y. The United States, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and Sweden lose their position in the ranking  with at least 
9 one value of 7.  It is evident that our choice of 7 could influence our view 
of inequality  and tax progressivity. 
Also  in table 2 measured tax progressivity and the percentage change in 
inequality  based on the four values of 7  are provided.  I* is sensitive to our 
choice of index.  Generally I* gets smaller as 7 -  0.  Furthermore, as 7 -  0 
the percentage change in  inequality due  to  taxes gets smaller  for Canada, 
Israel, United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands.  An interesting question 
is the existence of such an enormous tax progressivity differential between 
Sweden (low) and the Netherlands (high).  Both countries report some of the 
lowest observed inequality.  One  suspects that the initial endow&nts  must 
play a crucial role in each country. 
We can assess the 
a)  pre-tax and 
b)  an index of 
pre-tax and 
c)  the between 
and Iw*. 
d)  the within-group inequality  for each quintile,i.e.  It. 
impact  of taxation in each country  by looking at: 
post-tax income distributions. 
progressivity I*  ,  which is the difference between 
post-tax income distribution. 
and average within-group  components  of I* denoted by 
the 
Ib* 
All  of  the  above  are  provided  for  each  of  the  ten  countries  under 
consideration.  I will  limit my  analysis of  the decompositions to Theil's 
second  measure  of  inequality with  7  -  -1.0.  This  is  a  member  of  the 
Generalized Entropy family of measures which  satisfies the  income-weighted 
decomposability property.  A  complete discussion of  the  above  property  is 
provided in Bourguignon (1979).  The results based on 7 -  - 2.0, - 0.5, and 
0.0 can be made available  to those interested. 
Looking at table 3, the overall inequality  and its decomposition  based on 
GI (pre-tax income) and DI (post-tax income) is provided for each of the ten 
countries.  For each of the countries the measured inequality based on GI is 
10 greater than that 
I/W  -  I+DI), 
However the degree 
very hard  to rank 
based on  DI.  Looking at  the progressivity index, I* - 
all  these  countries  have  progressive  income  taxation. 
of progressivity varies across these countries and it is 
them.  For example, 
France  than Australia  and  Germany? 
country is about 22%, while in absolute 
is my  judgment that analysis based  on 
investigation  of  the  between-group 
decompositions  is inadequate. 
are income taxes more progressive in 
The  reduction  of  inequality  in  each 
terms Germany ranks as the lowest.  It 
the  index  of  progressivity without 
as  well  as  average  within-group 
\ 
In the case just cited, it is apparent from table 3 that in Germany the 
cross-group equalization has been much greater than in France or Australia. 
Within-group  inequality  in  Sweden,  the  Netherlands,  Germany,  the  United 
Kingdom and Israel has increased due to progressive taxes, and has partially 
offset  the fall in  the between-group component of  the overall  inequality. 
That  is,  in  the  case  of  Germany  the  between-group  fall  in  inequality 
constitutes 116%  of  the  overall  fall  while  the  average  within-group has 
increased  by 16%.  Looking at the data for Sweden, it appears that a similar 
pattern  is  detected where  within-quintile  inequality  has  increased while 
between-quintile inequality has  fallen.  At the same time Sweden enjoys the 
lowest recorded inequality  among all nations. 
It appears that Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom subscribe to similar patterns of taxation where Ib* is falling while 
Iw* is rising.  However only in the case of Germany and Sweden is the rise 
uniform  across  all  quintiles.  It  is  further  interesting  to  note  that 
within-group  inequality  for quintiles 3 and 4 has increased for all countries. 
It  has  been  argued  that  this  40%  of  the  population  (the  middle  and 
upper-middle class) has shouldered most of the tax burden, partially because 
it receives  few tax breaks. 
11 The  movement  from  the  lowest  quintile  to higher  quintiles  reveals  that 
inequality  among households  gets smaller as we move  from low-income  households 
to high-income  households.  This  is particularly  true with  inequality  based  on 
GI  and  the  first  four  quintiles.  This  pattern  changes  with  DI  to  the  third 
quintile.  A  possible  explanation  is  the  fact  that  in  most  countries 
households  in  higher  quintiles  have  incomes  closer  to  the  mean  for  that 
quintile.  This  is not  true for  the highest  quintiles  where  the variation  is 
substantial.  It  is  important  to  note  that  our  choice  of  7  does  make  a 
significant  difference  for some countries.  That is to say both  the magnitude, 
as well  as direction  of change  in inequality  due to income  taxes are affected. 
It is my judgment  that covering  a wider  range of r's increases  reliability. 
IV.  ARE MULTI-EARNER  FAMILIES WORSE OFF? 
In the past  two decades  in most western  countries  there has  been  a move 
toward  multi-earner  families.  There  are many  possible  explanations  for  this 
phenomenon  and  many  studies  have  documented  the  observed  pattern.  It  is 
noticeable  that barriers  for women  to enter  the labor market  are much  lower, 
but  this does not suggest  that the earnings  gap has been narrowed.  Most women 
in  these  countries  are  in  the  secondary  labor  market  with  lower  wages  and 
benefits.  It  is  further  evident  that  family  members  pool  their  incomes  and 
try to take advantage  of economies  of scale.  However,  for tax purposes,  it is 
anticipated  that  some will  subscribe  to  income  snlittinp; if such  a provision 
is allowed  and makes households  better  off. 
It  is not  clear  if multi-earner  families  are  made  any  better  off  after 
taxes,  and whether  economies  of scale are evidenced  by  lower  inequality  among 
households  as  the number  of  earners  is  increased.  Furthermore,  the  observed 
reduction  of  overall  inequality  is  expected  to  be  most  attributed  to  the 
reduction  of  average  within-group  inequality.  If  this  is  not  observed,  it 
12 could be argued that the tax is distortionary, in the sense that we observe 
cross-group equalization.  A second category of households consists of those 
who are not engaged in  market activity,  but are retired or receiving some kind 
of payment from the government. 
For each country, the information  provided in table 4 is: 
a>  overall inequality  based on GI & DI 
b)  the  between-group  and  average  within-group  inequality  based  on 
decomposition  by 
c>  the  within-group 
d)  a measure of tax 
group  within the 
the number of earners in the household 
inequality 
progressivity  for the total population 
population. 
\ 
and for'  each 
e>  the  between and within-group components  of I* i.e. Ib* and Iw* 
Looking at the results  of overall inequality  based on GI and DI, the following 
observations  are made: 
a)  France and the United States trade 
Australia and  Switzerland  follow 
places as we move from GI to DI. 
in  the  same  fashion  and  trade 
rankings. They  are  followed  by  Canada,  Israel,  and  the  United 
Kingdom, where the latter two trade place after taxes.  The lowest 
inequality levels  are  reported  by  Germany,  the 
Sweden,  where the Netherlands takes lowest measured 
taxes. 
Netherlands  and 
inequality after 
b)  The observed  change in inequality  due to taxes can be converted into 
a measure of progressivity by looking at the difference of the two 
distributions  denoted by I*.  The ranking  by tax progressivity, as a 
percent  of  pre-tax  inequality  is  shown  to  be:  Israel,  the 
Netherlands,  France,  Australia,  the  United  States,  Canada,  the 
United Kingdom, Switzerland,  and Sweden. 
It is surprising to see Israel with a high rate of tax progressivity.  More 
13 surprising is that Sweden, with lowest measured pre-tax inequality and second 
lowest post-tax inequality, has one of the least progressive tax structures. 
I suspect the distribution of the initial  endowments  are a major reason. 
The decomposition  based on  the number of earners in the household is also 




The post-tax inequality has created more  equalization within each 
group and  it is a larger component of the overall reduction.  In 
case of Sweden it is 100% of the total reduction. 
Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  are  exceptions  to  the  above 
observation;  the  tax  has  brought  about  more  cross 
group-equalizations.  In the case of Germany, post-tax inequality is 
larger than pre-tax inequality  for single earner households. 
It is further observed that in most countries the measured pre-tax 
and post-tax inequality decreases as the number of earners rises. 
The exceptions are Sweden and the Netherlands. 
v.  IS THERE A TAX ADVANTAGE FOR LARGER  HOUSEHOLDS? 
It is a common practice to provide a deduction based on family size when 
calculating taxable income of households.  There  are many  other deductions 
involved as well, but this deduction is the most common and straight forward 
when itemization is not required.  It is not clear if this deduction provides 
an incentive to have larger households or whether in fact those with smaller 
households are being penalized.  One could argue that a fall in between-group 
inequality is not  desirable because households of  different  sizes are  not 
comparable in terms of  economic standing.  However,  a  fall  in the average 
within-group component of overall inequality  is desirable since households of 
the same size are treated more equally. 
To address the above concerns, decomposition  based by the size of family 
14 is provided  in  table 5.  The  grouping was  based  on  families of  size  one 
through five and more.  The following  observations are made: 
a>  The average within-group component is the dominant portion of  the 
overall inequality  based on GI and DI. 
b)  The post-tax inequality for each group is smaller than the pre-tax 
inequality  with the exception of largest household (group five+) in 
Germany. 
C)  The fall in overall inequality after taxes has resulted in greater 
reduction  within each group so cross-group equalization is minimal. 
The above observations indicate  that households of equal sizes are affected in 
such a fashion that inequality among them has decreased.  The between-group 
component of the reduction of the overall inequality constitutes a very small 
proportion of  this reduction, and  in the case of Sweden it has  increased. 
Thus,  these  countries do  in  fact  favor  differential treatment of  similar 
households.  However, in Germany, Israel, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, 
between 12%-32% of the overall reduction is due to tax progressivity and it is 
attributed to the cross-group equalizations.  In these countries there is a 
stronger tendency for similar  treatment of households, regardless  of size. 
There also seems to be a pattern with respect to the size of families and 
the measured inequality in some of these countries.  The measured inequality 
for  each  group  gets smaller as  the household  size  gets  larger.  This  is 
particularly true for households of up to four people, the exceptions being 
the Netherlands, France and Switzerland.  Thus, in some countries there seem 
to be fewer tax incentives  available for larger households.  On the contrary, 
it could be that larger households are of two different kinds: those who are 
financially sound and can afford to have large families, and those who must 
remain  in  the  same  household  to  take  advantage  of  economics  of  scale. 
Consequently we  observe a  large amount of measured  inequality.  The  above 
15 patterns are true with respect to within-group tax progressivity.  That is, 
generally  smaller  households  have  higher  progressivity  than  do  larger 
households  of up  to  four.  Taxes  are much more  punitive  the  smaller  the 
household in these countries.  The exceptions are once again the Netherlands, 
France, and Switzerland. 
VI.  ATKINSON  l4EASURlIS  AND TWO MJ3ASURlIS  OF TAX PROGRESSIVITY 
An alternative  approach to measure inequality in each country is to use 
the  measures  provided by  Atkinson  (1970).  A  brief  description  of  such 
measures was provided in equation (4), the where index of relative inequality 
is given as IE(y) and E  is the inequality aversion parameter.  Looking at 
table 6,  three values of E  are used  to measure  inequality based  on  gross 
income (GI), and disposable income (DI) for each of the ten countries.  The 
ranking of these countries is not much different from those shown in table 2. 
However, there are differences in the magnitude of the measured inequality in 
each  country for  each choice  of  E.  It  is evident that  the  choice of  E 
(measure of inequality)  effects the measured inequality,  although the ranking 
of  each country may not  change.  The  results indicate that as E +  0,  the 
measured  inequality gets smaller as well.  This  is true regardless of  the 
choice  of  household income  i.e. GI  vs  DI.  As  anticipated, the  post-tax 
distribution  is  more  equal.  Thus,  IE(DI)  is  smaller  than  IE(GI).  The 
after-tax ranking  of the Netherlands and Israel  has improved regardless of the 
choice  of  E, but  the opposite holds  true for Sweden,  the United  Kingdom, 
Switzerland, and Germany.  Using Atkinson measures, Kiefer  (1985) suggested 
the progressivity index given in equation (9),  i.e. PE.  The results based on 
this index are given in table 6.  It is clear that generally as E + 0, the 
measured PE gets smaller.  The exceptions are those for the United States and 
France.  In absolute  terms, the reduction in the measured inequality  has been 
16 substantial  for  Israel,  the  Netherlands, and  Germany.  Also,  these  are 
countries with some of the lowest observed inequality.  The magnitude of our 
observations and those results are sensitive  to the choice of E. 
Using these same measures, Blackorby  and Donaldson (1984)'approached  the 
concept of progressivity differently.  For them, the measured progressivity is 
basically "one  minus inequality."  This is shown in equation (10) to be as Pg. 
The results based on P; are shown in table 6 as well.  Pg is very sensitive to 
the choice of E.  The following observations  are made about this index: 
a)  as E + 0, Pz becomes smaller. 
\ 
b)  countries such as the United States and France could be viewed as 
having  the most progressive index and  the least progressive index 
depending on the choice of E.  Therefore, there is value judgment to 
be made about the tax system in each of these countries. 
c)  the ranking of Israel, Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, 




is evident from our observations above that one needs to look 
such measures  in order  to broaden our view  of  the existing 
post-tax income distribution.  More importantly  the decompositions 
at a family 
pre-tax and 
are crucial 
to  learn  about  the  source  of  inequality and  the  fashion  in  which  it  is 
changing after taxes. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  provided  comparisons of  pre-tax  and  post-tax  income 
inequality among households in ten different countries.  In addition I have 
introduced a measure of tax progressivity  using Generalized Entropy Measures. 
The decomposition property of the indices allows us  to learn about factors 
that might contribute to inequality  and might further be a source in which to 
17 provide after-tax benefits.  It is clear that generally there is  a  reduction 
of inequality  after taxes.  However, at the same time,  within-group inequality 
can increase.  Taxes are shown to be progressive in each of these countries, 
but one has to be very cautious in making judgments about the nature and the 
effect of  income taxation.  The  family of  progressivity indices, based  on 
Entropy Measures and Atkinson measures, shows the sensitivity of our results 
to the choice of inequality  measure used.  In general the ranking of  those 
countries with  higher  reported  inequality both  before 
sensitive  to  the  choice  of  index  used,i.e.,  France, 
Australia,  Switzerland and Israel.  The  ranking based 
income for countries with low inequality in general is 
and  after  taxes  is 
the  United  States, 
\ 
on  pre  and  post-tax 
less variant  to the 
choice of index,i.e.,  Sweden, the Netherlands,  Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Canada.  This study has also shown the richness of the data sets currently 
available in Luxembourg  Income Study. 
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19 TABLE 1 
RANKING  OF NATIONS 
PRE-TAX & POST-TAX  INCOME SHARE BY QUINTILE* 
Country  Quint 1  Quint 2  Quint 3  Quint 4  Quint 5 
France'  GI  ,051  .097  .143  .205  .505 
1979  DI  .059  .109  .158  .221  .453 
United States@ GI  .041  .098  .165  .251  .445 
1979  DI  .050  .113  .176  .254  .407 
Australia@  GI  .047  .104  .173  .249  ,428 
1981  DI  .058  .119  .180  .248  .395 
Switzerland  GI  .057  .117  .161  .214  .450 ’ 
1982  DI  .065  .124  .166  .215  .431 
Canada@  GI  .049  .112  .178  .251  .409 
1981  DI  .056  .122  .184  .249  .389 
Israel  GI  .052  .114  .171  .246  .417 
1979  DI  .069  .132  .186  .243  .370 
United Kingdom GI  .050  .108  .183  .252  .407 
1979  DI  .059  .116  .184  .250  .391 
Germany  GI  .061  .126  .182  .247  .383 
1981  DI  .077  .140  .184  .245  .354 
Netherlands#  GI  .069  .128  .177  .244  .382 
1983  DI  .087  .139  .178  .240  .355 
Sweden#  GI  .070  .129  .181  .198  .422 













Some  *Only  households  with  positive  income  have  been  selected. 
inequality measures are not defined for income values of zero.  The German 
data  set  excludes  some  8%  of  households  with  foreign  national  heads  of 
household.  The data set for Israel does not represent some 10% of the rural 
population.  Also  the United State  data set has a tope coding of $50,000.  The 
noted problems with data sets alter the true inequality. 
#@ only  50  and  30 percent of the sample are used respectively. 
20 TABLE 2 
BANKING BY SEVERAL INEQUALITY  MEASURES 
BASED  ON GROSS (GI)  AND DISPOSABLE (DI)  INCOME 
Rank  r-  -1.0  Rank  7 - -2.0  Rank 7 - -0.5 
France  GI (1) 
DI [21 
1* 
United  GI (2) 
States  DI [l] 
I* 
Aust.  GI  (3) 
DI [41 
1* 
Switz.  GI  (4) 
DI [31 
1* 
Canada  GI (5) 
DI [51 
1* 
Israel  GI (6) 
DI [71 
1* 
United  GI (7) 
Kingdom DI [6] 
1* 
Germany GI (8) 
DI [91 
1* 
Neth.  GI  (9) 
DI [lo] 
1* 































































































































Rank 7 - 0.0 
(1)  -4073 
[ll  .2882 
.1191 
(29.2%) 
.2902  (3)  .2739 
.2331  [31  .2175 
.0571  .0564 
(19.6)  (20.5%) 
.2605  (4)  .2506 
.2020  [41  .1924 
.0585  .0382 
(22.4%)  (23.2%) 
-2851  (2)  .3318 
.2497  [21  .2864 
.0354  .0454 
(12.4%)  (13.6%) 
.2324  (6)  .2187 
.1990  [61  .1873 
.0334  .0314 
(14.3%)  (14.3%) 
.2356  (5)  .2333 
.1732  171  .1750 
.0624  .0583 
(26.4%)  (24.9%) 
.2259  (7)  .2166 
-1962  I51  .1912 
.0297  .0254 
(13.1%)  (11.7%) 
.1831  (8)  .1764 
.1454  [81  .1421 
.0377  .0343 
(20.5%)  (19.4%) 
.1719  (9)  .1677 
.1328  (101  .1305 
.0391  .0372 
(22.7%  >  (22.1%  > 
.1659  (10)  .1599 
.1436  191  .1369 
.0223  .0230 
(13.4%)  (14.3%) 
@ The values in the  brackets are percentage change in inequality due to taxes. 
21 TABLE 3 
REDISTRIBUTION  THROUGH TAXATION, INEQUALITY  BY QUINTILE, -y  - -1.0 
Overall Between  Within Quint 1 
Country:  France, 1979 
GI  0.3508  0.2958  0.0551  0.0988 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.2737  0.2291  0.0448 '0.1001 
Do, Db, 
Iw* 0.0771  0.0667  0.0103 
DW  1.0  0.8651  0.1336 
Country:  United States, 1979 
GI  0.3426  0.2936  0.0492  0.1777 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.2762  0.2289  0.0474  0.1759 
Do, Db, 
Iw* 0.0664  0.0647  0.0018 
DW  1.0  0.9744  0.0271 
Country:  Australia, 1981 
GI  0.2997  0.2559  0.0440  0.1420 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.2323  0.1930  0.0395  0.1392 
Do, Db, 
Iw* 0.0674  0.0629  0.0045 
DW  1.0  0.9332  0.0668 
Country:  Switzerland,  1981 
GI  0.2875  0.2267  0.0610  0.1268 
DI 
Ib*, 
0.2509  0.1941  0.0570  0.1180 
Do,  I*, Db, 
Iw* 0.0366  0.0326  0.0040 
D"  1.0  0.8907  0.1093 
Country:  Canada 1981 
GI  0.2695  0.2318  0.0378  0.1327 
DI 
Do;  1* Ib  D'; 
0.2293  0.1925  0.0370  0.1293 
D"  Iw*  0  1'8  0402  0.0393  0.9776 
Israel, 1979 
0.0199  0.0008 
Country: 
GI  0.2573  0.2251  0.0323  0.0859 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.1840  0.1495  0.0345  0.0740 
Do, Db, 
Iw* 0.0733  0.0756 -0.0022 
D"  1.0  1.0314 -0.0300 
Country:  United Kingdom, 1979 
GI  0.2512  0.2313  0.0202  0.0366 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.2135  0.1918  0.0219  0.0382 
Do, Db, 
Iw* 0.0377  0.0395 -0.0017 
D"  1.0  1.0477 -0.0451 
Country:  Germany, 1981 
GI  0.2025  0.1761  0.0265  0.0817 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.1574  0.1237  0.0338  0.0844 
Do, Db, 
Iw* 0.0451  0.0524 -0.0073 
DW  1.0  1.1619 -0.1619 
Country:  Netherlands, 1983 
GI  0.1897  0.1589  0.0309  0.1068 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.1439  0.1113  0.0327  0.1019 
Do, Db, 
Iw* 0.0458  0.0476 -0.0018 
DW  1.0  1.0393 -0.0393 
Country:  Sweden, 1981 
GI  0.1854  0.1516  0.0339  0.1223 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.1611  0.1106  0.0507  0.1378 
Do, Db, 
Iw* 0.0243  0.0410 -0.0168 
D"  1.0  1.6872 -0.6914 
Quint 2 Quint 3 Quint 4 Quint 5 
0.0077  0.0054  0.0069  0.1567 
0.0081  0.0060  0.0073  0.1027 
0.0157  0.0093  0.0065  0.0369 
0.0153  0.0097  0.0072  0.0293 
0.0209  0.0062  0.0060  0.0448 
0.0149  0.0067  0.0063 '0.0304 
0.0080  0.0032  0.0039  0.1622 
0.0087  0.0040  0.0050  0.1487 
0.0155  0.0056  0.0051  0.0300 
0.0141  0.0070  0.0068  0.0275 
0.0099  0.0055  0.0060  0.0542 
0.0145  0.0132  0.0146  0.0566 
0.0233  0.0053  0.0045  0.0311 
0.0206  0.0092  0.0075  0.0340 
0.0099  0.0039  0.0040  0.0333 
0.0136  0.0159  0.0120  0.0432 
0.0074  0.0037  0.0046  0.0323 
0.0102  0.0092  0.0105  0.0320 
0.0058  0.0036  0.0026  0.0307 
0.0270  0.0247  0.0248  0.0369 
22 TABLE  4 
REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH TAXATION, INEQUALITY BY NUMBER OF EARNERS, 7 - -1.0 
Overall Between  Within 
Country:  France, 1979 
GI  0.3508  0.0349  0.3160 
DI  0.2738  0.0354  0.2385 
1*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0770 -9.0005  0.0775 
Do, Db, D"  1.0  -0.0065  1.0065 
Country:  United States, 1979 
GI  0.3427  0.1056  0.2372 
DI  0.2762  0.0824  0.1939 
I*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0665  0.0232  0.0433 
Do, Db, D"  1.0  0.3489  0.6511 
Country:  Switzerland,  1982 
GI  0.2875  0.0498  0.2378 
DI  0.2510  0.0410  0.2101 
I*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0365  0.0088  0.0277 
Do, Db, D"  1.0  0.2411  0.7589 
Country:  Canada, 1981 
GI  0.2695  0.0902  0.1794 
DI  0.2293  0.0787  0.1507 
I*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0402  0.0115  0.0287 
Do, Db, DW  1.0  0.2861  0.7139 
Country:  Israel, 1979 
GI  0.2573  0.0625  0.1948 
DI  0.1840  0.0392  0.1448 
I*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0733  0.0233  0.0500 
Do, Db, D"  1.0  0.3179  0.6821 
Country:  United Kingdom, 1979 
GI  0.2513  0.1395  0.1119 
DI  0.2136  0.1170  0.0967 
I*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0377  0.0225  0.0152 
Do, Db, DW  1.0  0.5968  0.4032 
Country:  Germany, 1981 
GI  0.2026  0.0952  0.1074 
DI  0.1575  0.0505  0.1069 
1*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0451  0.0447  0.0005 
Do, Db, DW  1.0  0.9911  0.0111 
Country:  Netherlands, 1983 
GI  0.1898  0.0543  0.1355 
DI  0.1440  0.0402  0.1038 
I*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0458  0.0141  0.0317 
Do, Db, DW  1.0  0.3079  0.6921 
Country:  Sweden, 
GI  0.1854  0.0531  0.1325 
DI  0.1612  0.0531  0.1082 
I*, Ib*, Iw* 0.0242  0.0000  0.0242 
Do, Db, D"  1.0  0.0000  1.0000 
One  TWO  Three  None 
0.3703  0.2173  0.1552  0.3732 
0.2931  0.1554  0.1157  0.2614 
0.0772  0.0619  0.0395  0.1118 
0.3023  0.1430  0.1058  0.3079 
0.2451  0.1039  0.0802  0.2803 
0.0572  0.0391  0.0256  0.0276 
0.2691  0.1245  0.2762 
0.2431  0.1073  0.2301 
0.0260  0.0172  0.0461 
0.2349  0.1126  0.0959  0.2348 
0.1965  0.0901  0.0770  0.2094 
0.0384  0.0225  0.0189  0.0254 
0.1974  0.1063  0.0869  0.3639 
0.1286  0.0720  0.0571  0.3554 
0.0688  0.0343  0.0298  0.0085 
0.1420  0.0747  0.0588  0.1433 
0.1247  0.0657  0.0544  0.1184 
0.0173  0.0090  0.0044  0.0247 
0.1023  0.0738  0.0505  0.1610 
0.1032  0.0724  0.0462  0.1598 
-0.0009  0.0014  0.0043  0.0012 
0.1268  0.1219  0.1872  0.1510 
0.0977  0.0949  0.1327  0.1149 
0.0291  0.0270  0.0545  0.0361 
0.1613  0.0631  0.1093  0.1839 
0.1369  0.0422  0.0988  0.1353 
0.0244  0.0209  0.0105  0.0486 
23 TABLE 5 
REDISTRIBUTION  THROUGH TAXATION, INEQUALITY  BY FAMILY SIZE, 7 - -1.0 
Overall Between Within 
Country:  France, 1979 
GI  0.3508  0.0657  0.2852 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.2738  0.0627  0.2112 
Do, Db, 
Iw*  0.0770  0.0030  0.0740 
D"  1.0  0.0390  0.9610 
Country:  United States, 1979 
GI  0.3427  0.0642  0.2786 
DI 
Ib*, 
0.2762  0.0623  0.2140 
Do,  I*, Db, 
Iw*  0.0665  0.0019  0.0646 
DW  1.0  0.0286  0.9714 
Country:  Switzerland,  1982 
GI  0.2875  0.0642  0.2234 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.2509  0.0597  0.1914 
Do, Db, 
Iw*  0.0366  0.0045  0.0320 
D"  1.0  0.1230  0.8743 
Country:  Canada, 1981 
GI  0.2695  0.0562  0.2134 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.2293  0.0552  0.1742 
Do, Db, 
Iw*  0.0402  0.0010  0.0392 
DW  1.0  0.0249  0.9751 
Country:  Israel,  1979 
GI  0.2573  0.0398  0.2175 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.1840  0.0289  0.1551 
Do, Db, 
Iw*  0.0733  0.0109  0.0624 
D"  1.0  0.1487  0.8513 
Country:  United Kingdom, 1979 
GI  0.2512  0.0889  0.1625 
DI 
Do,  I*, Db,  Ib*, 
0.2135  0.0858  0.1279 
Iw*  0.0377  0.0031  0.0346 
D"  1.0  0.0822  0.9178 
One  TWO  Three  Four  Five+ 
0.2310  0.3602  0.2809  0.2530  0.2606 
0.1915  0.2537  0.2037  0.1860  0.1990 
0.0395  0.1065  0.0772  0.0670  0.0616 
0.3574  0.2888  0.2331  0.2066  0.2123 
0.2764  0.2157  0.1822  0.1612  0.1650 
0.0810  0.0731  0.0509  0.0454  0.0473 
0.2512  0.2687  0.1570  0.1442  0.1606 
0.2151  0.2236  0.1379  0.1337  0.1430 
0.0361  0.0451  0.0191  0.0105 '0.0176 
0.3125  0.2263  0.1744  0.1471  0.1448 
0.2568  0.1811  0.1433  0.1228  0.1174 
0.0557  0.0452  0.0311  0.0243  0.0274 
0.3742  0.3118  0.1666  0.1505  0.1588 
0.2666  0.2401  0.1135  0.1076  0.1013 
0.1074  0.0717  0.0531  0.0429  0.0575 
0.2258  0.1884  0.1212  0.0981  0.1150 
0.1647  0.1446  0.1040  0.0877  0.1003 
0.0611  0.0438  0.0172  0.0104  0.0147 
Country:  Germany,  1981 
GI  0.2025  0.0627 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.1574  0.0481 
Do, Db, 
Iw*  0.0451  0.0146 
D"  1.0  0.3237 
Country:  Netherlands,  1983 
GI  0.1897  0.0265 
DI 
1*, Ib*, 
0.1439  0.0211 
Do, Db, 
Iw*  0.0458  0.0054 
DW  1.0  0.1179 
0.1944  0.1790  0.1000  0.0786  0.0850 
0.1422  0.1305  0.0889  0.0661  0.0880 





0.1697  0.1478  0.1974  0.1272  0.2190 
0.1172  0.1058  0.1538  0.1032  0.1778 





Country:  Sweden,  1981 
GI  0.1854  0.0305  0.1550 
DI 
I*, Ib*, 
0.1612  0.0353  0.1259 
Do, Db, 
Iw*  0.0242 -0.0048  0.0291 
DW  1.0  -0.1983  1.2025 
0.2168  0.1571  0.1333  0.1178  0.1172 
0.1631  0.1261  0.1158  0.1044  0.0993 
0.0537  0.0310  0.0175  0.0134  0.0179 
24 TABLE  6 
REDISTRIBUTION  THROUGH TAXATION 
ATKINSON MEASURES 





















































GI  DI 
0.5424  0.4889 
0.2959  0.2395 
0.1680  0.1284 
p,  pE 
0.0535  0.1169 
0.0564  0.0801 
0.0396  0.0476 
0.7584  0.7142  '0.0442  0.0730 
0.2901  0.2414  0.0487  0.0596 
0.1398  0.1132  0.0266  0.0292 
0.6842  0.6219  0.0623  0.1973 
0.2590  0.2073  0.0517  0.0698  ' 
0.1260  0.0985  0.0275  0.0315 
0.6060  0.5453  0.0607  0.1541 
0.2499  0.2219  0.0280  0.0373 
0.1375  0.1210  0.0165  0.0191 
0.5777  0.5296  0.0481  0.1139 
0.2362  0.2049  0.0313  0.0410 
0.1128  0.0970  0.0158  0.0178 
0.4431  0.3376  0.1055  0.1894 
0.2268  0.1681  0.0587  0.0759 
0.1143  0.0847  0.0296  0.0334 
0.4570  0.4057  0.0513  0.0945 
0.2222  0.1923  0.0299  0.0384 
0.1098  0.0957  0.0141  0.0158 
0.3948  0.3203  0.0745  0.1231 
0.1833  0.1456  0.0377  0.0462 
0.0895  0.0714  0.0181  0.0199 
0.3981  0.3160  0.0821  0.1364 
0.1728  0.1340  0.0388  0.0469 
0.0841  0.0653  0.0188  0.0205 
0.4175  0.3693  0.0482  0.0827 
0.1692  0.1488  0.0204  0.0246 
0.0812  0.0705  0.0107  0.0116 
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